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Abstract
Drawing on recent contributions inferring financial interconnectedness
from market data, our paper provides new insights on the evolution of
the US financial industry over a long period of time by using several tools
coming from network science. Following [1] a Time-Varying Parameter
Vector AutoRegressive (TVP-VAR) approach on stock market returns to
retrieve unobserved directed links among financial institutions, we recon-
struct a fully dynamic network in the sense that connections are let to
evolve through time. The financial system analysed consists of a large set
of 155 financial institutions that are all the banks, broker-dealers, insur-
ance and real estate companies listed in the Standard & Poor’s 500 index
over the period 1993 − 2014. Looking alternatively at the individual,
then sector-, community- and system-wide levels, we show that network
sciences tools are able to support well known features of the financial mar-
kets such as the dramatic fall of connectivity following Lehman Brothers
collapse. More importantly, by means of less traditional metrics, such
as sectoral interface or measurements based on contagion processes, our
results document the co-existence of both fragmentation and integration
phases between firms independently from the sector they belong to, and
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in doing so, question the relevance of existing macroprudential surveil-
lance frameworks which have been mostly developed on a sectoral basis.
Overall, our results improve our understanding of the US financial land-
scape and may have important implications for risk monitoring as well as
macroprudential policy design.
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1 Introduction
The strong interdependence among financial institutions has been emphasised
in numerous academic contributions, mainly after the 2007 − 2008 worldwide
financial crisis, leading to a gradual shift from a micro to a macroprudential
approach to financial stability.1 Yet, the progress made to exploit the potential
of this system-wide framework is still limited compared to other fields, such as
physics, neurology or biology to quote only a few in which network and complex
systems’ representations have been deeply rooted for decades [3, 4].2 Given
the importance of financial stability on economic growth and welfare, it seems
critical to pursue the effort in this direction and to accelerate the “transfer of
knowledge” from other fields to expend our understanding of financial systems.
Against this background, the aim of this paper is twofold. On the one hand,
it brings up-to-date knowledge from network science to economic and financial
systems. More specifically, we use a large set of tools devoted to the anal-
ysis of network’ structures in order to improve our understanding of the US
financial industry over a long time span. By doing so, we are able to identify
phases of integration and fragmentation in the industry, both within as well as
across financial sectors. As such, our results can document among others the
debate regarding the relevance of sector-based metrics and supervision author-
ities for macroprudential surveillance.3 On the other hand, the specificities of
our dataset, as detailed below, and in particular the observation of a highly
dynamic system over a long period of time, are intended to provide new insights
to network science.
One of the greatest difficulties faced by researchers when analysing financial
networks lies in the lack of reliable and comprehensive datasets on the physi-
cal relationships between institutions. To deal with this issue, a now common
approach in the literature consists of making use of information embedded in
market-based data as done in [5, 6]. In a nutshell, financial institutions repre-
sent the nodes of the network with the linkages reflecting the relative influences
between pairs of firms, which corresponds for instance to how much stress for
an institution as materialised by severe losses, is transmitted to another insti-
tution. The identification of those links is based on the statistical measurement
(be it correlation or other form of causal measure, for instance) of temporal
dependences between one or several observable characteristics associated to the
nodes, such as their stock market returns. Relying on this approach to form
1According to the Financial Stability Board (FSB) and the Basel Committee for Banking
Supervision (BCBS), financial interconnectedness is a determinant of systemic risk along with
cross-jurisdictional activity, size, substitutability and financial institution infrastructure and
complexity. It is defined as the network of contractual obligations which can potentially
channel financial distress [2]
2As discussed in [3, 4] one of the fruitful consequences of the financial crisis was the scientific
opening to understand and accept the view of an economic and a financial landscape as a
complex system. However, this approach is still in its infancy compared to other disciplines
in which specific tools have been developed to analyse complexity.
3In 2011, the Bank of New York Mellon, State Street Corporation, and Northern Trust
Corporation (collectively Specialized Custody Banks) addressed the following concern to the
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision: In its assessment of interconnectedness category as
used [for measuring systemic importance of banks], we recommend that the Proposal better
define Financial Institution in designating the assets and liabilities to be included in these
indicators. For example, it is unclear the extent to which the definition of Financial Institution
includes collective investment vehicles such as mutual funds, collateral investment pools, or
other types of private funds and investment vehicles.
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pairwise connections instead of observed physical contracts or transactions be-
tween institutions implies that the information propagating over the system, far
from being innocuous, strongly affects all the nodes in the path. In other words,
the links of our system reflect effective transmission channels of financial distress
(i.e. based on changes in the firms asset value) as opposed to potential channels
stemming from physical connections, such as cross-lending or common portfolio
holdings. In this paper, we follow a market-based approach to retrieve the net-
work representation of the financial system whose characteristics will then be
studied by means of several network metrics successively considering individual,
then sector-, community- and finally system-wide analyses. More specifically,
we apply the causal version of this approach in which statistical dependences are
assessed with time lags to recover the directionality of the relationship and in
turn, separate influencer from receiver nodes. Another important aspect of our
system is that nodes are institutions belonging to four different financial sectors,
i.e. banks, broker-dealers, insurance companies and real estate companies. As
a consequence, we are able to study whether the level of potential disruptions
caused by any propagation mechanisms may depend, not only on the structural
position of the nodes in the network (i.e. their level of criticality), but also on
the sectors those nodes belong to. Importantly, our network is fully dynamic
in the sense that it is analysed over successive periods with potential changes
within its structure over time. Last but not least, we go beyond sector-based
categories to identify sub-groups of institutions by using a more agnostic ap-
proach consisting in applying a community detection algorithm which allows to
recover “data-driven” groups of highly connected financial institutions.
Following [1], the linkages between financial institutions are retrieved from
stock market prices by means of Bayesian Time-Varying VAR framework in the
vein of the one developed by [9] for macroeconomic data. One of the main ad-
vantages of this methodology is that it allows to generate temporal networks
in a widely spaced period of 20 years, where connections are evolving gradu-
ally through time. Another powerful characteristic is that it does not use the
common rolling window approach, where causal relationships are estimated over
successive sub-samples which may lead to several empirical problems that may
blur the identification of real linkages between nodes. Instead, statistical infer-
ence is established by taking into account the whole temporal spectrum of the
data, therefore overcoming some limitations of rolling-window approaches, ap-
proaches, regarding sensitivity to window sizes and outliers. This methodology
is applied to a large dataset that can reasonably be considered as an adequate
representation of the US financial system over two decades as it embeds all the
financial firms listed in the S&P 500 index, belonging to the four previously
mentioned sectors. Overall, it includes 155 financial institutions for which we
observe monthly stock prices from April 1993 to November 2014. Working at
a relatively low frequency allows avoidance of potential problems due to stock
market noise and eases the identification of causal linkages. This analysis is
performed at the system wide, sectoral and community levels. For the former
approach, we apply the so-called “Louvain method” on our networks at each
period considering undirected edges. By doing so, we recover a set of com-
munities within which financial institutions could influence each others. The
“Louvain method” has been widely used in the network science literature to
isolate groupes of highly connected nodes.
Equipped with this dynamic representation of the US financial industry, our
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main goal is then to describe its characteristics with a set of metrics taken from
network science. Accordingly, we do not intend here to provide an in-depth
analysis of the impact of network topology on market stability, nor do we doc-
ument the driving factors of network formation. Such avenues in a context in
which the dynamic nature of financial systems has been properly featured are
left for future research. We believe, however, that this contribution provides
important insights to complement existing studies that use network representa-
tions to analyse the financial industry. Among the most related contributions,
we can quote [5, 6]. In their pioneering works, they propose a way to overcome
the absence of comprehensive data on physical relationships between financial
institutions, by inferring the network from stock market data. Applying the
Granger-causality test on bivariate models [5] or more sophisticated Vector Au-
toregressive model and variance decomposition [6], they provided the first set of
empirical evidence regarding the structure of interconnectedness for the finan-
cial industry, including banks, insurance companies or investment funds. One
of the main caveats of this generation of studies lies in the way the temporal
nature of financial networks was dealt with as they did rely on successive snap-
shots of the industry at different time periods by the mean of rolling windows
regressions. Recently, there have been a few studies among which [1, 10] some
have developed methodological approaches specifically designed to better tackle
the time varying dimension of the financial system and infer fully dynamic net-
works [1, 10]. However, these contributions do not exploit in full the set of
tools offered by network science to document salient patterns, relying on degree
centrality measures. We propose to fill the existing gap in this contribution by
addressing these two caveats together.
By doing so, we more specifically contribute to the literature by shedding
a new light on the following issues : (i) the influence/vulnerability of financial
institutions at the individual and at the sector level, and (ii) the fragmenta-
tion/integration of the whole financial industry. For this, we concentrate on six
specific aspects of the network : (i) degree centrality, (ii) community structure,
(iii) component structure, (iv) sector interface, (v) katz centrality and M-reach
centrality (contagion process), (vi) “top” institution behavior.4
Our results document 20 years of the evolution of US financial industry. The
critical role played by the banking and the real estate sectors in the successive
episodes of financial turmoil appears clearly, the former emerging as a major
transmitter of risk in the industry, while the latter appears as the main ab-
sorber. The insurance companies also appear as central because of both their
exposure to the rest of the system and their effect on other institutions. The
role of broker-dealers conversely has been more moderated than the three other
industries all over the sample. Our results also provide important evidence
4At each time period, we define as top institutions, those having a centrality measure
greater than 85% of the highest value in that period, that is for which the value falls into a
range defined by the highest value on one side and a threshold equal to 85% of the highest
value on the other side. The centrality is calculated by using alternative measures throughout
the study, such as in-degree, out-degree or betweenness to cite a few. Then, we count the
number of institutions belonging to the top list for each sector. This measure is inspired by
the one developed in [9]. It is simple to implement and enables easy comparison of the level
of connectedness of the different sectors when considering only the contribution of the most
connected institutions, that we call top institutions. This local measure also reflects how much
the most central institution of the system that is the most risky or the most vulnerable is
isolated or if there is group of highly connected institutions during the period at stake.
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regarding the co-existence of both fragmentation phases within the financial in-
dustry along with overall increasing integration among firms, in whatever the
sector they belong, which, as a result, questions the accuracy of sector-based
macroprudential frameworks 5. From a network science perspective, our re-
sults illustrate the relevance of the traditional tools developed in this field for
analysing spillover-based financial networks. Specifically, it shows that relevant
information can be retrieved from financial data with centrality measures at
the node- and sector-level. It provides evidence that specific group-detection
approaches such as community structure or component structure detection al-
gorithms are of interest to create agnostic categories of financial institutions in
addition to sector-based groups. It documents the quasi equivalence on financial
data of alternative measures such as contagion process and the Katz centrality
6. Lastly, we confirm the interest of extracting information from top values of
centrality measures as done among others in [11] in the context of Wikipedia
page edition.
The remainder of the paper is the following. We describe in the second
section the construction of the network. The third section discusses the results.
We start with an analysis of the networks main characteristics at the sectoral,
community and component levels. Then, we examine sectoral interface and
eventually discuss tools related to contagion modelling. Finally, the fourth
section concludes.
2 Methods
To represent the interdependencies at stake in the financial system, we follow [1]
who propose a framework based on on time-varying parameter vector autoregres-
sions, as in [9, 12] to recover a network of financial spillovers - or causality-based
network - that is entirely dynamic. In their framework, financial institutions rep-
resent nodes in a directed network. Whereas spillovers, measured as temporal
dependence between the stock price returns of the financial institutions, rep-
resent the directed edges of the network. Temporal dependence between stock
returns is measured according to the following vector autoregression:
Rt = ct +BtRt−1 + ut (1)
where Rt = [r1t, ..., rNt]
′
is the vector of the stock returns of the N financial in-
stitutions in the network. ct is the time-varying intercept, whereas Bt is a NxN
matrix of time-varying autoregressive coefficients, which determines the tempo-
ral dependence between the stock returns and therefore the directed spillovers
between the financial institutions.
Precisely, a directional edge is drawn at period t from i to j, if the ji element
of Bt, B
(ji)
t , is significantly different from zero. The framework parallels the
classic time-invariant approach of recovering financial spillover networks using
Granger causality, see e.g., [5].
5Current supervision system is articulated around Basel III for banks, Solvency II for
insurance companies and the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive 2004/39/EC (known
as “MiFID”) for European investment funds for instance.
6We set the number of steps for the contagion process (M-reach centrality) to two, and the
damp parameter to 0.625 for the Katz centrality.
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Finally, the errors, ut, are assumed to be normally distributed, with mean
zero and variance-covariance matrix Σ (see Appendix SA of the Supporting
Information). The original model of [1] allows for heteroskedasticity and fat-
tailed errors. Here, however, we adopt a simpler approach and standardize (so
to have unit variance) the returns, r1t, ..., rNt, in a previous step by using a
GARCH(1,1) model to estimate the time-varying volatility.
The model in Eq. 1 can be re-written in a compact-form, as
Rt = X
′
tθt + ut, (2)
where Xt = IN ⊗ [1, Rt−1] and IN is a NxN identity matrix. ⊗ is the Kronecker
product, and θt is a vector with the stacked elements of ct and Bt.
The time-varying parameters are then assumed to evolve according to a
random walk:
θt = θt−1 + νt, (3)
where νt ∼ N(0, Q).
This assumption allows the time-parameters, ct and Bt to evolve flexibly over
time and to allow the data to speak by itself. The amount of time-variation,
is governed by the variance of the errors, Q, which is estimated along with the
other parameters of the model, θt and Σ.
Finally, in order to determine the existence of a link from i to j, at a given
time period t, we test the following null hypothesis:
H0,t : B
(ji)
t = 0 ∀j 6= i (4)
The model outlined in equations 1, 2 and 3 is estimated using Bayesian
techniques following [13]. Then, the hypothesis given by equation 3, is tested
using Bayesian inference. Specifically, we use Bayes Factor, which gives the
odds in favor of the null hypothesis against the alternative hypothesis, H1,t :
B
(ji)
t 6= 0, without assuming that the null hypothesis is true. Bayes Factor is
estimated following [14]. Once we retrieve Bayes Factor, we look at the implied
probability that is true 7.
We use the implied probability to retrieve the network at different cut-off
points. Effectively, the cut-off is a filtering mechanism and a higher cut-off
leads to a more dense network with more links. The stability of our analysis is
assessed by varying the cutoff levels of the statistical test used for detecting the
links. In most of the figures throughout the study, the four following cutoffs are
considered to be: 5%, 7%, 10% and 15%.
The prior distributions assumed for the parameters to retrieve the Bayesian
estimates, are given in Appendix SA1. The posterior distribution algorithm,
which, for the time-varying parameters, uses the Kalman filter and smoother as
per Carter and Kohn (1997), is given in Appendix SA2.
We applied the model to all financial institutions among banks, insurers and
real estate companies (SEC codes 6000 to 6799) that were components of the
S&P 500 between January 1990 and December 2014. For these companies we
collected the stock price at monthly close from Thomson Reuters Eikon over
the same time period. Initially the sample contained 182 firms but was reduced
to 155 after restricting our analysis to stocks with at least 36 monthly observa-
7If Kˆjit is Bayes Factor for H
(ji)
0,t , then the implied probability is just Kˆ
ji
t /(1 + Kˆ
ji
t )
7
tions. As mentioned, all returns were standardized using a GARCH(1,1) model,
to account for heteroskedasticity, prior to applying the time-varying framework
highlighted above.
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Figure 1: Number of connected nodes per financial sector (i.e. sub-
networks) from April 1993 to November 2014. From top to bottom:
banks (green), broker-dealers (purple), insurance companies (blue) and real es-
tate companies (yellow). The different tonalities in each plot are related to the
sensibility parameter (i.e. test’s cutoff levels for detecting significant links) set
to 5 % (softest tonality), 7%, 10% and 15% (dark grey) respectively.
3 Results
3.1 Sector-based behavior
In this section, we provide an overview of the network. The number of nodes in
the system as well as centrality measurements are displayed by sector.
Fig. 1 shows the number of connected nodes comprising our network across
time among the different sectors mentioned above. We can notice, from a first
visual inspection, that the main patterns characterising the evolution within
each sector are not sensitive to the choice of the cutoff level used to detect
the links. Comparing now the series across sectors, Fig. 1 exhibits contrasting
dynamics. In particular, while the number of connected banks has steadily de-
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creased since 1995, insurance companies and real estate companies experienced
two successive phases characterised by an upward trend until late 2008 followed
by a reversal. The number of broker-dealers overall displays more stability.
It is worth recalling at this stage that as our connections are built on causal
relationships among asset prices; an institution identified as not connected to
rest of the network can to some extend be physically related to other insti-
tutions. However, such relationship does not materialise into spillover effects.
Fig. 2 completes the picture by adding up the number of nodes across sectors 8.
We can more clearly observe from there the various phases at the system-wide
level. From 1993 to 1997, the number of connected nodes sharply increased,
being mainly driven by the banking sector. The trend reversed then until 2001,
reaching a total of 55 connected nodes from 70 in 1997. From 2001 to 2008,
the upward trend resumes to attain the highest level of the whole sample by
peaking at more than 80 nodes. Interestingly, as noted in Fig. 1, the number
of banks decreased over that period. Hence, our data reveals the presence of a
shift among the set of large connected institutions from the US financial indus-
try in the run-up to the financial crisis with insurance companies as well as real
estate companies, and to a lower extend broker-dealers, gaining in importance
within the system. Eventually, the size of the network dramatically shrunk after
2008, reaching its lowest level at around 35 connected nodes - in our case the
number of institutions influencing or been influenced by the rest of the system
- institutions in late 2013. The four sectors were almost equally affected by this
drop. Such a result implies that many institutions became isolated or weakly
connected to the rest of the system 9.
From this first inspection, we can notice that the dates of the successive
turning points correspond to well-known financial events such as the Asian crisis
in late 1997, the burst of the so-called “dot.com” bubble in 2001 as well as the
2007 - 2009 financial crisis.
Next, we adopt another perspective by considering directed linkages between
the set of institutions constituting our networks. Fig. 3 reports the share of
incoming (in-degree) and outgoing (out-degree) connections per sector10. Be-
cause our directed links depict causal relationship between stock market returns
in the sense that they differentiate the transmitter from the receiver of the fi-
nancial stress, the in-degree allows measurement of how many institutions (from
the whole sample) are affecting that sector whereas the out-degree accounts for
how many of them are being affected by that sector. In accordance, the former
measure characterises the sector vulnerability and the latter its influence. To
ease temporal comparisons, we propose a slightly modified version of the raw
in- and out-degree centrality measures as we normalise all the values by the
total number of links in the system at each given point in time. This mea-
sure can be analyzed in level or in variations to visualize more easily periods
8For the sake of clarity, we will often show across the paper the results related to the sole
10% cutoff level. The figures for other significance cutoff levels are available upon request.
9It is worth reminding that our identification strategy for the links is based on statistical
tests. Therefore, the absence of a link between pairs means that we do not have enough
evidence, or, said differently, the evidence is too weak in the data to reject that institutions
could be independent.
10The share reported for a sector is computed as the ratio between (i) the total number of
incoming (outgoing) links attached to the nodes belonging to this sector, that is the in- (out-)
degree associated to those nodes, and (ii) the total number of links in the system.
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Figure 2: Each bar size represents the number of connected institu-
tions within our four sectors, from April 1993 to November 2014:
banks (green), broker-dealers (purple), insurance companies (blue) and real es-
tate companies (yellow). Values are displayed at quarterly frequency to ease the
visualisation. The sensibility parameter has been fixed to 10%.
of acceleration or deceleration in network evolution. For the sake of simplic-
ity, we keep the analysis in level in what follows. A visual inspection of Fig. 3
shows a first notable feature for out-degrees: the banking sector experienced
more pronounced changes than other sectors, especially in the 90s. This obser-
vation is in line with previous discussions in the literature about the large-scale
reshaping of the banking industry amid increased competition, consolidation,
and efficiency gains. As described in [13], banks embraced the new approach to
client-based universal banking during this period, leading to a merger wave in
the US banking sector. This change affected the number of banks in the market
but also deeply affected their functioning. Our data indicates that it went along
a diminution of the influence of the whole sector on the system.
A second notable feature is the occurrence of a shift point at the beginning
of 1999. From this date onwards, the drop in the banking sectors share of
outgoing links more or less stopped, to remain stable at around 30% and 40%.
By contrast, the insurance companies and, to a lesser extend, real estate firms,
followed an opposite pattern. Both sectors experienced an increase in their
influence until the late 90s before stabilising around 30% and 35%. From early
2000, the outgoing links of the four sectors have been kept in close ranges with
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a slight domination of insurance companies which can be deemed in this respect
to be the most influential sector in the system, especially once the 2007 - 2009
crisis burst out. The time series for incoming links offer a different picture. For
any of the four reported figures, the cycle of upward and downward trends is less
pronounced than for outgoing links as is the heterogeneity across sectors. Banks
are still the most connected during the first years of the sample, exhibiting a
ratio of incoming links over total links (relative in-degree) of about 60%-80%
as compared to about 10%-30% for other sectors. However, their role as an
important receiver of spillovers in the system kept decreasing until 2010 before
slightly bouncing back. This result complements the well-known dramatic fall in
the number of US banks failing over the 90s as reported by the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation.11
Another interesting result lies in the central role played by the real estate
sector which appears as the most exposed sector between the two crises. Hence,
from 2001 to 2009, its ratio of incoming links over total links was around 30%
compared to 20% on average for the others. This finding means that part of
the underlying risk borne by real estate companies before the 2007 crisis was
detectable by using this indicator. At this stage however, we should be careful in
our conclusions as our measurement of sector-based influence and vulnerability
embeds two different effects: a size effect due to the relative importance of the
sector in the system and an individual effect corresponding to the connectedness
of the nodes populating the sector. Part of the former results for the banking
sector in Fig. 1 to Fig. 3 for instance can be at least partly driven by the fact
that many banks have disappeared over the sample. The number of real estate
companies and broker-dealers has grown over the years, whereas the number of
insurance companies has remained constant. Accounting for these underlying
changes in the sample could in turn change the picture.
The next set of measurements builds on those presented in Fig. 3, while
correcting for the size of each sector. It is computed as the average per sec-
tor of outgoing (resp. incoming) links divided by the total number of links.
By doing so, we want to abstract any potential size effect (i.e. the fact that
some sectors populate the system in greater magnitude) to assess the influential
(resp. vulnerable) nature of the components of each sector as opposed to the
actual influence (resp. vulnerability) of the sector as a whole. Fig 4 displays
the evolution of the in- and out-degree centrality measurements along with their
variance. High values of variance are signs of broad dispersion (that is, hetero-
geneity among firms regarding that specific dimension) within each sector. We
can observe that it peaks when both crises occur. A second notable feature is
that while the banking sector remains the most influential sector in the early
90s, the picture regarding its vulnerability with respect to the rest of the sys-
tem changes markedly once we control for the size. Now, it does not appear as
different from others. This result illustrates the interest of computing various
measurements as they can provide different information. The way to interpret
this finding is that banking institutions were not more vulnerable than other
financial actors when taken individually. However, because the sector was the
largest (i.e. had the highest number of connected actors) in the financial indus-
try at the time, it was the greater receiver of spillovers. The figures regarding
relative incoming links (Fig. 3) were therefore mainly driven by a size effect.
11See https://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/banking/2006jan/article2/fig5.htm.
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Figure 3: The left (right) panel displays the relative in-degree (out-
degree) per sector, from April 1993 to November 2014: number of
incoming (outgoing) links of all the nodes attached to a sector, divided by the
total number of links - banks (green), broker-dealers (purple), insurance com-
panies (blue) and real estate companies (yellow). The results are reported for
different values of the sensitivity parameter (i.e. test cutoff levels for detecting
significant links). The transparent grey corresponds to US recessions as defined
by the NBER.
Another point calling for attention is the bell-shape curve observed at the time
of the 2007-2009 financial crisis for all the series, with the notable exception of
the banking sector relative to incoming links. Such a pattern confirms increased
connectedness in the run-up to the crisis and a fragmentation of the US financial
network in the aftermath of the Lehman Brothers collapse. If we compare the
respective position of each series, our results also confirm that the banking sec-
tor was mainly a transmitter of risk rather than a receiver during the crisis, the
real estate companies appearing as the main vulnerable element of the system
with the highest average of incoming links. Eventually, the figure unveils a novel
12
feature about insurance companies which exhibit the highest level of influence
on the rest of the system from 2000 to 2010.
Figure 4: The left (right) panel displays the averaged In-degree (Out-
degree) Centrality, from April 1993 to November 2014: averaged over
sectors - banks (green), broker-dealers (purple), insurance companies (blue) and
real estate companies (yellow). The variance of the centrality values is reported
in shallow with the same colours.
We now focus on the most extreme cases by considering the concentration of
institutions within the top 20% values of the two metrics discussed above. For
this, we consider for each month the different centrality measurements across
institutions. We rank all the values in descending order. We take the first one
(i.e. highest value), then, we create a threshold equal to 80% of the highest
value. The range between the highest value and the threshold corresponds to
the top 20% highest values. Next, we count the number of institutions per
sector falling into the top 20%. The outcome of the procedure measures the
level of concentration of institutions among the highest centrality values for a
given month. It also indicates whether the most central institution is isolated
or part of a group. If the resulting values are low, for instance, it means that
one institution stands out above the others in term of centrality. Conversely,
if they are high, it means that several institutions potentially belonging to the
same sector are important contributors to the connectivity of the system. When
centrality is interpreted as a source of risk it means that the risk is not driven
by a single institution but by a set of institutions. Fig. 5 displays the results
for relative in and out-degree centrality along with the traditional betweenness
centrality measure. For instance, it shows that among the top 20% highest
values of relative outgoing links, three institutions (nodes) were associated to
banks in 1994 and three to real estate companies in 2011.
Therefore, just a few institutions stand out in terms of centrality during
these two periods and among them we counted several banks in the first years
of the sample and several real estate companies at the end. More generally,
we observed groups of influential institutions instead of isolated top institution
in the early 90s and in the banking sectors before shifting to real estate and
insurance companies in the aftermath of the 2007 - 2009 crisis. Such a fea-
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ture illustrates how such representation can be of interest for documenting and
analysing sector-related patterns versus institution-specific patterns. Turning
to relative incoming links, the concentration of the main receivers reached its
highest level between the two crises with a dominance of real estate companies
and, to a lower extent, insurance companies. The role of real estate companies
and banks is in line with previous evidence from Fig. 3 and Fig. 4. Fig. 5 also
provides new insights, especially regarding the vulnerability of insurance com-
panies in the years preceding the crisis. Likewise, the figure more clearly points
out the concentration of most vulnerable institutions in the run-up to the crisis
between 2001 and 2007. The third measurement added to Fig. 5 relied on be-
tweenness centrality. Betweenness centrality, in networks representation takes
high values for nodes with central location. Being central refers for a node to
the number of minimum paths between two other nodes in the network passing
through it. It is worth noting, however, that the measure is built on undirected
links, making its interpretation difficult in the context of risk propagation anal-
ysis. Therefore, its inclusion has to be mainly viewed as a benchmark. Our
results show notable discrepancies between the patterns that emerged from in-
and out-degree centrality measures and the betweenness centrality, stressing
the influence of considering the direction of the links when constructing such
metrics. We also detect similarities. In the three cases, for instance, the most
pronounced changes over the period covered correspond to well known financial
events. More specifically, we uncover a concentration of top institutions outside
the crisis periods. This feature is consistent with the idea that financial risk
is building up in periods of calm - here the risk corresponds to increased con-
nectedness - and eventually materialised into a sudden collapse of the system
before building up again. Such correspondence between the centrality measures
and financial events tends to confirm the relevance of top representations for
analysing financial networks and systemic risk.
3.2 Components and Communities
In the previous sections, we have analysed groups of institutions based on their
sectoral classification, which correspond to ex-ante information. In the subse-
quent section, we now consider an alternative (ex-post) approach according to
which institutions sharing strong connections as identified by specific algorithms
are included in the same group as done in [7, 15], for instance. More specifically,
we consider two different approaches. The first one relies on the identification
of specific components, that is sets of nodes that are connected by means of
at least one link between any pair of them. In our temporal network, several
institutions are deemed to belong to the same component if they are connected
to at least one of the nodes included in the component structure. Remind that
two nodes are directly connected in our context if there exists a statistical de-
pendence between the stock market returns time series, associated to that pair,
during that month. For this analysis, peer-interdependence in stock market
prices is used with a cutoff (tests cutoff levels for detecting significant links) of
10%.
Given the soft character of this measurement, the most useful information
we can retrieve from its implementation on our data is concerned with the
composition of the small clusters that we identify not to belong to the biggest
component. These clusters are made of institutions independent from the global
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Figure 5: In-degree, out-degree and betweenness top rank sectors, from
April 1993 to November 2014. The size of the circles represents the number
of institutions with in-degree, out-degree and betweenness among the top 20%
highest values at each period.
system but still connected in smaller inter-dependent groups. For instance, in
1993 the biggest component included about 50 nodes. Four small components of
two or three nodes each could be detected, leaving about 30 nodes unconnected
or too weakly connected to be considered as such to the rest.
The first notable observation in Fig. 6 is the agglomeration of almost all the
institutions in the biggest component over the whole sample, denoting global
dependence of institutions among financial companies in the US. Yet, the num-
ber of non-connected or isolated, institutions is not negligible, as represented in
dotted background. In most of cases, there are also a few institutions that are
gathered in very small groups. The 2007-2009 crisis period is particularly inter-
esting. We observe a growing integration of the US industry as materialised by
the detection of only one single large component in 2007 and 2008 as opposed
to two, three or four small components in the years before. During this period,
the largest component attains its sample peak at 90 (for a total of about 110
nodes at this date). Since then, a fragmentation process has been ongoing until
2014 with both more components and an abrupt and monotonous drop in the
total of connected nodes.
Fig. 7 provides complementary insight by combining pieces of information on
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Figure 6: Each bar represents the size of the components, from April
1993 to November 2014. The dotted background depicts the total number
of institutions for each month. The green colour is attached to the biggest
component, the red colour to the second biggest and so on.
the components and on the sectors. Two features emerge from this exercise.
First, the picture provided by the banking sector is contrasted. On the one
hand, most of the institutions from that sector are part of the biggest compo-
nent and only very few of them belong to smaller components. On the other
hand, many banks and insurance companies appear isolated. The situation is
more balanced for other sectors. Broker-dealers and real estate companies are
mainly integrated within the biggest component at the beginning of the sample
while a non-negligible part of these institutions move to small components or
become isolated in the post-crisis period. A detailed study about the formation
(and stability) of the components is out of the scope of the present study, but
this analysis might be of interest for future research.
The classification in components is related to the occurrence of at least one link
between pairs of nodes. A more nuanced way to gather the nodes into relevant
groups of interacting entities relies on the identification of community struc-
ture. A community is a set of nodes more connected between them than with
the rest of the system. There exist several algorithms to identify community
structures. Our community detection was performed relying on the Louvain
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Figure 7: Number of institutions per sector broken down into the
number of institutions in the biggest component (plain-light colour),
the number of institutions in small components (plain-dark colour)
and the number of isolated institutions (dotted-light colour), from
April 1993 to November 2014.
algorithm. [16] 12. The goodness of a partition is measured by the modularity.
For the undirected version of our networks (where the community detection has
been performed), optimising modularity can be interpreted both, as optimis-
ing a particular stochastic block model and a particular diffusion process on
the networks [17]. The best partition is the one that maximises modularity. In
our causality-based networks, institutions grouped into communities means that
their market returns display strong temporal dependences. Fig. 8 reports the
number of institutions constituting communities within the biggest component.
We recall that a detailed analysis of the dynamic nature of those communities
and their determinants over time is out of the scope of the study. However,
we can make some general remarks from this figure, such as the presence of a
higher number of communities than the number of sectors, showing that both
pieces of information are not redundant. Also, it seems that the community
structures exhibit strong stability over time. For instance, we do not observe
the same downward slope pattern that was noticed for the number of connected
banks in Fig. 8. We do observe, nevertheless, a slight peak around the time of
12http://perso.crans.org/aynaud/communities/
17
the 2007-2009 crisis, characterised by a small decrease in the number of com-
munities and an increase in the number of institutions included in the biggest
components - sum of institutions across communities, meaning that communi-
ties size expanded during this period. Interestingly, the patterns observable in
Fig. 8 are very much comparable to those discussed for Fig. 6, that is, higher
integration during the 2007-2009 crisis and increased fragmentation afterwards,
characterised by the emergence of many clusters of institutions.
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Figure 8: Each bar represents the number of institutions making up
each community within the giant component, from April 1993 to
November 2014. From bottom to top, the green colour is attached to the
biggest community, the red colour to the second biggest and so on.
3.3 Interface
This section aims to complement previous analysis by combining information on
institutions’ linkages and their sector-based classification. To that end, we use
the notion of “sectoral interface”. We define a link as being part of the interface
if it connects two nodes belonging to different sectors (see Fig. 9). In Fig.
10 we show the proportion of sectoral interface inside the largest component.
Two different background colours are used to indicate two successive phases. In
green is a monotonous increasing phase, where the proportion of links between
different sectors is growing until the first 2001 crisis, starting from around 35%
in 1993 to 80%. After this turning point, in pink, the proportion of inter-sectoral
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links stabilise while keeping fluctuating around 80%. It is important to note that
the rising pattern is not a symptom of an inflated number of links in the system,
as the values shown are normalised. The measurements are shown for different
values of the sensibility parameter (5, 7, 10 and 15%), in order to illustrate the
robustness of the results. The pattern that we identify here in sectoral interface
illustrates the high level of integration of the financial industry and in particular,
the presence of strong connections across sectors that can be traced back long
before the occurrence of the 2007-2009 crisis. Also, it shows that the level of
integration across sectors was far lower in the 90s, a decade which experienced
several large-scale bankruptcy episodes in the financial sector such as the failure
of LTCM with less comparable impact on the real economy than the 2000s
crises. The transition phase that we have been able to identify echoes previous
Figure 9: A link is defined as part of the interface if its two connecting
nodes belong to different sectors.
results in the literature reporting the existence of similar transition phenomena
in economics [18, 19].
3.4 M-reach centrality (contagion processes) vs. Katz
centralities
We complete our analysis of the financial industry by going beyond direct con-
nections and considering indirect ones. To this end, we use the Katz centrality
measure as in [20], along with the contagion process which has been more con-
sidered in financial application. Katz centralities are measurements used to
understand the importance of each node. It measures the connections of a node
with other nodes of the network through both direct and indirect links. The
weight attached to each direct and indirect connected nodes is a function of the
distance between the two nodes. In accordance, the more indirect the connec-
tion - that is, the more intermediate nodes - the higher the distance and the
lower the weight. Formally, the distance is featured through a penalising atten-
uation factor. The Katz centrality is a good alternative to eigenvector centrality
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Figure 10: Proportion of sector-interface inside the giant component
from April 1993 to November 2014, for different values of the test’s
cutoff levels for detecting the significant links. Two different background
colours are used to indicate two different phases: in green, a monotonous in-
creasing phase, and in pink, a stable phase around 0.8. It is important to notice
that the rise is not a consequence of increments in the number of links, as the
values showed are normalised. The measurements are shown for different values
of the sensitivity (i.e. cutoff) parameter.
for measuring centrality beyond first-degree nodes when the network is sparse
or directed.
An alternative and intuitive approach to Katz centrality is achieved by ap-
plying percolation theory and computing the m-reach centrality. In the context
of outgoing links, it builds on a very similar principal to the Katz centrality
measure by identifying how influential each node is in its ability to spread in-
fection or shocks - in our case severe losses - to the rest of the system. In our
simple contagion process, we start with an infected node as an initial seed and
then we count the number of nodes touched by this infection through outgoing
links (see top panel of Fig. 11). We can illustrate the algorithm with the follow-
ing example. Starting from one node with three outgoing links, three nodes are
infected in the first step. In the second step, the three infected nodes become
diffusers of the disease to their neighbours via their outgoing connections and
so on. We stop the procedure at the third iteration and count the total number
of infected nodes. Note that the contagion process will highlight the structural
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role of nodes. For instance, the target node in Fig. 11 is weakly connected to
the network and with a peripheral role; however, its connectivity to a highly
central hub contributes structurally to global connectivity. To detect vulnerable
nodes, we apply the same procedure, having initially inverted the direction of
all the arrows in the networks (see bottom panel of Fig. 11). After three steps,
the higher the number of infected nodes, the higher the number of institutions
influencing the stock market price of the institution from which we started. The
effect of inverting the arrows over the contagion process gives the number of in-
fluencer institutions each node is vulnerable to, then characterising its level of
fragility.
Figure 11: Infection process. Top figure: Infection process in three steps to
calculate the biggest influencer and vulnerable nodes. Bottom figure: Direction
of the arrows to calculate the influencer institutions (left) and the vulnerable
nodes (right).
In Fig. 12, we compare the results obtained by means of our contagion
process with the Katz centrality measure. We stop the contagion process at the
second iteration. For both measures, we count the number of institutions per
sector which fall into the top 20% highest values. As explained in a previous
section, the top 20% embeds the values ranging from the highest centrality value
in a given month to a threshold which is equal to 80% of the highest value. This
procedure is repeated at every period to flag the most influential/vulnerable
institutions over time. The circles in the top panel, display the influence of
each sector for the contagion process. Those for the Katz centrality stand just
below. A visual inspection of the two subfigures support the closeness of their
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information content as the patterns are very similar over the whole sample. We
can nevertheless notice a few differences. Among them, we can cite the role of
the banking sector before the 2001 crisis which is characterised as a substantial
propagator of spillovers only when using the Katz centrality measure. Turning to
nodes influence, we can see that both results again provide similar information:
(i) the banking sector is highly influential from 1993 to 2001, (ii) the insurance
companies along with banks have emerged over time as key transmitters in the
financial industry.
Figure 12: Most influencer and vulnerable nodes by means of a conta-
gion process in the upper part, followed by the Katz centrality, from
April 1993 to November 2014. The size of the circles represents the number
of institutions with out-degree and in-degree among the top 20% highest values
of the sample.
3.5 Temporal measurements
More recently, a new line of research in network science has aimed to develop
specific metrics for dynamic systems as opposed to standard metrics applied
on successive static snapshots of time evolving networks. In accordance, we
propose to apply as a last exercise a metric embedding information on the
temporal sequence of edges and nodes. Fig. 13 displays both temporal and a
static metric. The former is computed by sector as the sum of top 20% most
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central institutions. We do it for both in-degree (i.e. “vulnerable” nodes) and
out-degree (i.e. “influencer” nodes). We detail below how out-degrees and in-
degrees are computed to account for time variation in the connections. Starting
with in-degree, at each point in time, we first count for each node the number
of incoming links at time t. We then count the number of incoming links at the
previous period, i.e. at t− 1, of the connected nodes. We can view this measure
as a modified version of the M-reach centrality in which first order connections
and second order connections stem from networks at two successive time periods.
By doing so, the metric features potential time delay in the contagion process
and account for the sequence of appearance and disappearance of links over
time. The reverse logic is applied for out-degree. At time t, we count the
number of outgoing links (i.e. connected nodes). By doing so, we identify for
each node a set of influenced nodes (i.e. nodes from the network connected
through outgoing links). Then, at t + 1, we count the number of links of the
connected nodes. The spirit of such a measure is to the one of an infection
process with time delay in which for instance first order neighbors are infected
at time t considering the state of the network at time t and then second order
neighbors are infected at time t+1 considering the state of the network at time
t + 1. Fig. 13 also displays, above each temporal metric, the previous static
version of the M-reach centrality metrics that is when we count the number of
second order neighbors at fixed time period. We observe that both temporal
and static metrics provide consistant information regarding the vulnerability
and influence of sectors. We also note a few differences. A notable divergence
for instance lies in the high concentration of vulnerable sectors in the run up to
the 2007-2009 financial crisis that appears with the temporal metric and is less
visible with the static one.
4 Conclusion and Discussion
Using a large set of tools from networks science, causality-based networks have
been analysed in a large set of 155 financial institutions: all the banks, broker-
dealers, insurance and real estate companies listed in the Standard & Poors 500
index during the period 1993 - 2014. In contrast to main body of research on
financial networks, we pay particular attention to its temporal dimension by
following the approached used in [1] designed to deal with its dynamic nature
of financial institutions connections. Equipped with these dynamic causality-
based networks, we describe its evolution per sector in the vein of [10] by using
traditional tools from networks science such as centrality measures based on in-
degree and out-degree as well as more advanced tools. The latter are intended
to expend further traditional analysis by extracting information that was not
attainable using simple sectoral centrality measures. Among the set of tools we
are using, we can specifically emphasise measures of community and component
structures as well as interface identification to offer a different view on the frag-
mentation/integration processes that took place over time in the US financial
industry. We also apply an algorithm derived from the percolation theory to
shed light on the question of influencing/vulnerable nodes or groups of nodes.
Eventually, we propose a top institution representation drawing on the most
highly connected institutions. By doing so, we can provide original empirical
insight and tackle the following two objectives of the paper: (i) to provide new
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Figure 13: Most influencer and vulnerable nodes by means of an in-
stantaneous contagion process (static 2-reach centrality measure), in
the upper part, and a contagion process with time delay (temporal
2-reach centrality measure), in the lower part from April 1993 to
November 2014. The size of the circles represents the number of institutions
with out-degree and in-degree among the top 20% highest values of the sample.
insights to network science by the mean of financial data, and (ii) to improve our
understanding of the US financial industry over a long time span. Regarding
our first objective, our work is one more attempt to construct a bridge between
the physics thinking, in the spirit of simplicity, and equivalence between mea-
surements. From the comparison of the different measures, our results tend to
show that a large set of information can be extracted from the traditional in
and out-degree centrality measures at three different levels: as (i) node-level,
(ii) sectoral level, and (iii) by considering top values. Further information can
be extracted from financial data by means of the communities and components
structures. Eventually, our results suggest the quasi-equivalence on financial
data of alternative measures as the one built on contagion process and the Katz
centrality.
Turning to the second objective related to the systemic risk analysis, our
results allow us to document four important patterns. First, banks have been
highly influential since the early 1990s as documented by the temporal evolu-
tion of our normalized out-degree measurement as well as the contagion process.
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Second, real estate companies have been the most vulnerable sector in the fi-
nancial industry especially during the period 2001 - 2007. This is illustrated by
in-degree centrality measurement and the (inverted) contagious process. Third,
market integration drastically increased in the run-up to the 2007 - 2009 cri-
sis either within the financial sector or between them. Component as well as
community structures provide clear evidence on this feature. Fourth, the US
financial industry has experienced a growing fragmentation from the crisis to
the late 2013. This pattern appears clearly from the analysis of component
and community structures. Finally, we applied a temporal measure, where the
previously developed contagious process is applied but now over consecutive
times windows. This last metric can be considered to study cascading failure
mechanism.
Such results open up two important observations. First, it confirms in a
dynamic context that various tools from networks science can improve our
knowledge of the financial system, stressing the need for further research in
this direction. Second, the identification of a high and persistent level of inte-
gration across sectors calls into question the current sector-based approach to
macroprudential surveillance.
This research can be extended in different ways. First, we rely in the whole
study on an unweighted network as done in [10]. A natural extension would be
to explore whether additional information is embedded in the intensity of links.
Second, in line with a recent strand of the literature in network science and as
illustrated in the last subsection of the analysis, using specific metrics dedicated
to temporal network appears as a promising line of research to analyse financial
systems.
Supporting Information: Appendix SA. Expan-
sion of section Methods: Considerations about
the prior distribution and the posterior distribu-
tion sampling algorithm model.
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